Eating Pure and True: Halal Businesses in
China
Food safety has always been problematic in
China. After the 2008 milk scandal, in which an estimated 300,000 babies were
made ill from contaminated milk that was reported to contain melamine, demands
from society have driven the food industry to implement further scrutiny.
Reporting on food safety violations has rocketed in recent years, thus making
many people seek safer food options with either imports or local alternatives.
Domestically, halal food has become an especially common alternative. In China,
halal products are called qingzhen, meaning “pure and true.” Since there is no
national organization that officially certifies halal food and since the
“halal” title symbolizes that certain food is prepared according to Muslim
traditions with generally stricter regulations than average Chinese food, the
certification process falls under local Islamic organizations like the China
Islamic Association. Driven by the high demand for halal food, the sector is
growing rapidly, increasing 6.4% per year. Nevertheless, while the halal sector
does provide a seemingly trustworthy alternative for domestic food products, it
has been controversial. Halal food has created a policy dilemma for the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP): to help promote halal business for economic purposes or
to stick to an atheist set of socialist values. This dilemma is only further
complicated by the growing Islamophobic rhetoric heard on social media from Han
Chinese, who are deeply unhappy with China’s changing religious and economic
landscape.
A qingzhen certificate issued by the China
Islamic Association. https://flic.kr/p/9Jh97o
The growth of the halal sector has
indirectly led to growing Muslim influence in the northern province of Gansu
where the ethnic population is predominately Hui, a Muslim minority. Unlike
Xinjiang’s Uyghurs who speak a Turkish dialect, Hui Muslims speak Mandarin and
are often indistinguishable from their non-Muslim neighbours when not wearing
their burqas or white caps. The Hui people’s cultural differences stem from
their distinct culinary practices and religious beliefs. Halal businesses are
often started and run by these Hui minorities, who incorporate their religious
practices into the preparation and marketing of food under the certification of
qingzhen. To acquire the certification, a unique procedure has to be performed
by an imam who prays over the slaughtering of animals and conducts other
religious rituals according to Quranic doctrine. This distinction prohibits
many restaurants and businesses from acquiring the certification because
Muslims want to preserve the holiness of their food. If non-Muslims want to
apply for the certification, they must follow all the Quranic guidelines
detailed by the China Islamic Association. Since some believe that the halal
symbol represents a safer food choice, many non-Muslim food industries want to
increase their competitiveness and attract more consumers by acquiring the
certification. Whether the owner of the business is Muslim or not, the halal
sector has thus emerged as a competitive food provider in the Chinese economy.
This certification process, however, has sustained
criticism due to its lack of regulation. Since there is no national standard
for the process, the granting of the certification is subject to the judgment
of local governments and sometimes local Islamic associations. Mandatory
religious rituals during food preparation give some economic and political
power to imams, who supposedly only serve as religious leaders approved by the
CCP. In some villages in Gansu, imams even have stronger cultural and religious
influence than the local government: they lead daily prayers, utilize money
from the halal sector to build mosques, and encourage the study of the Quran in
schools. This influence has even reached past imams’ original spheres of
influence in Muslim-populated regions.
This increasing religious influence
conflicts with the national policy of religion below the state. The CCP has
consistently emphasized that all religious practices should be under state
regulation and that they cannot interfere with policymaking. Gansu and its
neighbouring autonomous region, Ningxia, seem to be diverging from the wishes
of the CCP.
Hui Muslims praying inside a Chinese
mosque. http://bit.ly/2GKjiTX
The growth of halal sector imposes two
threats and contradictions on national policies. Under President Xi, the halal
sector has been subsidized and enjoyed tax-free zones to compete with neighbouring
Southeast Asian countries on the production of halal food. In addition, Xi’s
Belt and Road Initiative has sought opportunities to establish bilateral trade
agreements with Muslim countries for halal business. These state policies have
allowed the sector to grow immensely, while the Party’s more atheist principles
may contradict these economic incentives. The political status of Ningxia as a
“Hui Autonomous Region” has further complicated policymaking. On one hand, Hui
minorities are allowed self-rule and the practice of their beliefs; on the
other, local governments are required to accomplish national mandates. The
central-local relationship between local officials and the state poses the
question of whether the local officials should align themselves more with
Beijing or associate themselves with local halal businesses who provide them
with economic benefits. This balancing game exposes the potential danger of the
CCP losing its grasp over religious groups: if local officials bow to halal
businesses’ economic interests, they may be giving a green light to the
expansion of religious organizations’ influence.
This potential danger has manifested itself
in widespread fear among the Han population that, if the halal sector keeps
increasing, China will witness an Islamizing movement justified by economic
forces. The debate surrounding halal businesses and increasing Islamophobia was
particularly heated in 2016 when the CCP was said to be considering
standardizing halal business regulations due to several halal food scandals
after 2013. Anti-Islam sentiments in regards to the rise of halal foods have
maintained momentum even until today. This trend on the internet is increasing
cleavages between ethnic groups and possibly subjecting Muslim minorities hate speech.
With its religious influence expanding, the
halal sector has received much backlash on social media and from society. Many
Han Chinese have voiced their discontent with the growing presence of halal
businesses in non-Muslim regions. The halal sector does not limit itself to the
dairy and meat industry. Halal-only canteens have begun to appear in some
universities; salt, soy sauce, and other necessities are becoming
qingzhen-certified; and stories regarding Muslim segregationists circulate on
social media. Meituan, a food delivery service, has adopted a Halal-only
delivery box to expand its customers. This Meituan controversy has been viewed
by some internet users as a plot to destroy national ethnic unity and advocate
a Muslim identity above the rest of the population. One person wrote on Weibo,
the Chinese version of Twitter, “Muslims need a separate box even for a
delivery, you can see how they treat us, the non-Muslims one day… Meituan you
are helping them to hinder us. I will never use your service.”
Similar and more violent posts can be found
online. There are calls from Han communities to resist buying
qingzhen?certified products, and criticisms of officials in universities and
local governments have been gaining momentum since 2017. Critics of halal food
have gone so far as to accuse Muslims of betraying the core values of Chinese
society, which currently centre around the new Xi Jinping Thought to create a
socialist society with Chinese characteristics and with the Party as supreme
arbitrator. Within his rhetoric, President Xi has stressed that religions
should be Sinicized and, therefore, serve the interests of the CCP.
With momentum growing, it has the potential
to turn violent, either online or in reality. This potential places the
national government in a critical position: choosing between supporting
economic growth in the halal sector or addressing the grievances of the Han
people, who constitute more than 90% of the country’s population. During the
19th Party Congress, President Xi demanded that China “actively guide religions
to adapt to the socialist society” and impose further regulation on religious
associations. Nevertheless, this rhetoric seems unable to reconcile the
conflicts between halal supporters and halal objectors. There is a lack of
actual regulation on the ground to curb halal business, and violent
anti-Islamic posts are censored on the internet. The grievances of the people
have not been addressed properly since their calls for stricter regulations of
halal businesses have not been answered by the State Religious Affairs Bureau.
In fact, CCP has banned the use of anti-Islamic words online, and halal sector
is still expanding. The growing trend of Islamophobia and attacks on Muslim
culture and values is extremely problematic; yet at the same time, the idea of
an Islamic “penetration” into China worries many Han Chinese. The CCP, unclear
on whether it will draft regulations on the halal business, is becoming more
repressive in its rhetoric toward the Muslim minorities. How the CCP will
decide to balance its economic interests and atheist core values will determine
whether the growth of the halal industry or Islamophobic rhetoric will win this
round.
Posted by Lanya Feng
Link->https://www.mironline.ca/eating-pure-true-halal-businesses-china/ |